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John Wyclif (born near Richmond, Yorkshire, before 1330-died Lutterworth, 
Leicestershire, 31 Dec. 1384) was one of the most important and authoritative 
thinkers of the late Middle Ages. Not only did he lead a movement of opposition to 
the medieval Church and to some of its dogmas and institutions, thus becoming a 
forerunner of the Reformation (since influences of his main theological and ecclesi- 
ological doctrines can clearly be traced in Jan Hus and others right through Luther 
and Calvin), but he was also the most prominent English philosopher of the second 
half of the fourteenth century. His logical and metaphysical theories are, at the same 
time, the final result of the preceding realistic tradition of thought and the starting- 
point of the new forms of realism propounded at the end of the Middle Ages.1 Many 
authors active during the last decades of the fourteenth andlor the first decades of 
the fifteenth centuries, like the English Robert Alyngton (d. 1398), William Penby- 
gull (d. 1420), William Milverley, Roger Whelpdale (d. 1423), and John Tarteys,2 
I would like to express my gratitude to Jennifer Ashworth, who kindly read a previous 
draft of this article. The present version has greatly benefited from her suggestions and 
critical remarks. 
1. Wyclif did not espouse the cause of realism in his youth, but only later. Indeed, at 
the beginning of his studies, he sympathized with nominalistic views-cf. S. H. Thomson, 
"The Philosophical Basis of Wyclif's Theology," Journal of Religion 11 (1931): 89; J. A. 
Robson, Wyclifand the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 144-145; G. Leff, Heresy 
in the Later Middle Ages, 2 vols. (Manchester, 1967), 2501. This sort of conversion can 
explain the extreme rigour of his doctrine and the hint of fanaticism which sometimes can 
be perceived in his writings. 
2. For information on their lives and works see A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register 
of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500,3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-1959), sub vocibus. All of 
them studied and taught in Oxford: Alyngton at Queen's College, Penbygull at Exeter 
College, Whelpdale at Balliol and Queen's Colleges, and Tarteys at Balliol College. 
Excerpta from Alyngton's main work, a commentary on Aristotle's Categories, in A. D. 
Conti, "Linguaggio e realth nel cornmento alle Categorie di Robert Alyngton," Documenti 
e studi sulla tradizionefilosofica medievale 4 (1993): 242-306; excerpta from Milverley's 
Compendium de quinque universalibus, Whelpdale's Tractatus de universalibus, and 
Tartey's Problema correspondens libello Porphyrii in Johannes Sharpe, Quaestio super 
universalia, ed. A. D. Conti (Firenze, 1990), appendices 11, 111, IV, pp. 159-197. Penby- 
gull's De universalibus has been edited in A. D. Conti, "Teoria degli universali e teoria della 
predicazione nel trattato De universalibus di William Penbygull: discussione e difesa della 
posizione di Wyclif," Medioevo 8 (1982): 178-203. 
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the German Johannes Sharpe (d. after 1415),3 and the Italian Paul of Venice (Udine
1369-Padua 1429; one of the main logicians of the Middle Ages), were influenced
by his logical apparatus and metaphysical formulations.4
Prior to Mueller's critical edition of Wyclif's Tractatus de universalibus
(sixth treatise of the first book of the Summa de ente)5 medieval scholars and
historians of ideas had generally neglected Wyclif's philosophical system, fo-
cusing instead on his theology and/or on his political views.6 Wyclif's contem-
poraries, on the contrary, were much more excited by his metaphysical
3. On Sharpe's life, works, and thought see L. A. Kennedy, "The De anima of John
Sharpe," Franciscan Studies 29 (1969): 249-270; Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in
Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, pp. 211-38, and 323-36. Although German, Sharpe
spent about twenty years in Oxford (from the early 1380s to the first years of the fifteenth
century), as a student and a teacher of that university.
4. On Paul of Venice's life, works, and logico-metaphysical thought see A. D. Conti,
Esistenza e veritά. Forme e strutture del reale in Paolo Veneto e nel pensiero filosofico del
tardo medioevo, (Roma, 1996).
5. See J. Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus, ed. I. J. Mueller (Oxford, 1985)—all the
translations of this work are taken from J. Wyclif, On Universals, trans, into English by A.
Kenny (Oxford, 1985). Other works by Wyclif to which I refer in this paper are the
following: De ente praedicamentali (fifth treatise of the Summa de ente), ed. R. Beer
(London, 1891); Purgans errores circa veritates in communi, Purgans errores circa univer-
salia in communi, De intelleccione Dei (third and fourth treatises of the first book of the
Summa de ente, and first treatise of the second book respectively), ed. M. H. Dziewicki in
Johannis Wyclif De ente librorum duorum excerpta (London, 1909), pp. 1-112; De ente in
communi, De ente primo in communi (first and second treatises of the first book of the
Summa de ente), in Johannis Wyclif Summa de ente, libri primi tractatus primus et
secundus, ed. S. H. Thomson (Oxford, 1930); De materia et forma, in Johannis Wyclif
Miscellanea philosophica, ed. M. H. Dziewicki, 2 vols. (London, 1902-1905), 1: 163-242;
Tractatus de logica, ed. M. H. Dziewicki, 3 vols. (London 1893-1899). The Summa de ente
was written by Wyclif over a period between approximately 1365 and 1374; it was not
conceived and executed at one time, and so Wyclif arranged its thirteen treatises as a
Summa in two books only later. The first book (seven treatises) deals with being, while the
second one (six treatises) with God, considered according to His nature and actions. On the
philological problems concerning this work (authorship, date of composition, internal
structure and so on) see Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, pp. 115-40; W. R.
Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wycliff (Toronto, 1983), pp. 14-35; and Mueller's
introduction to his critical edition of the De universalibus, pp. xix-xxv.
6. Cf. G. V. Lechler, Johannes von Wyclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation
(Leipzig, 1873); R. L. Poole Wyclif and the Movements for Reform (London, 1889); J.
Gairdner, Lollardy and the Reformation in England, 4 vols. (London, 1908); J. Loserth,
Hus und Wye///" (Munich, 1925) 2d ed.; H. B. Workman, John Wyclif: A Study of the English
Medieval Church, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1926); K. B. McFarlane, John Wyclijfe and the Begin-
nings of English Non-Conformity (London, 1952); Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools',
L. J. Daly, The Political Theory of John Wye///" (Chicago, 1962); J. Stacey, John Wyclif and
Reform (London, 1964); Leff, Heresy, pp. 494-558; W Fair, Wyclif as Legal Reformer
(Leiden, 1974); the papers by J. I. Catto, G. R. Evans, and A. Hudson in The Bible in the
Medieval World, ed. K. Walsh and D. Wood (Oxford, 1985), pp. 269-315; and finally, the
papers by M. Wilks, D. Luscombe, H. Phillips, G. R. Evans, Th. Renna, A. K. McHardy,
K. Walsh, C. von Nolcken, and G. Fitch Lytle in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. A. Hudson
and M. Wilks (Oxford, 1987), pp. 135-64, 233-80, 361-68, 397-418, 429-44, and
465-79.
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novelties.7 Only in the last few years have interesting studies appeared which
are dedicated almost totally to the analysis of some of the main features of
Wyclif s philosophy.8 He revised Duns Scotus's notion of formal distinction,
and developed a form of intensional logic where the main relation between
beings is exactly that one of formal distinction, intended as the measure of the
coincidence of the metaphysical components of two res. Consequently, starting
from the definition of being as what can be signified by a complex expression,
Wyclif built up a metaphysics of essences (culminating in an ontological and
epistemological primacy of universals over any other kind of beings), by which
the "realisms" of the late Middle Ages were to be inspired.
Despite the revival of interest in Wyclif, many aspects of his ontological
doctrines still remain vague. In this paper I would like to take a step toward
clarifying the most conspicuous legacy he left to the subsequent generations:
the logical machinery drawn up in order to solve the chief metaphysical prob-
lems inherited from the scholastic tradition, together with the ontological context
in which the machinery itself was set. Since the cornerstone of Wyclif's phi-
losophy is his definition of being as significabile per complexum, in the first
section of my paper I shall describe Wyclif's notions of being and truth in their
mutual relationship, trying to explain the novelty of his conception. The second
section will be dedicated to Wyclif's theory of analogy, which is the logical
7. Cf. Robson, Wyclif, p. 118. For further information on Wyclif's philosophical
influence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries see Robson, Wyclif, pp. 10, 118, 142-43,
and 218-46; Conti, "Teoria degli universali e teoria della predicazione nel trattato De
universalibus di William Penbygull," pp. 137-66; A. Hudson, "Wycliffism in Oxford
1381-1411," in Wyclif in his Times, ed. A. Kenny (Oxford, 1986), pp. 67-84; M. Keen,
"The Influence of Wyclif," in Wyclif in his Times, pp. 127-45; Conti, "Studio storico-
critico," in Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, pp. 295-336, passim; E. J. Ashworth and
P. V. Spade, "Logic in Late Medieval Oxford," in The History of the University of Oxford,
ed. J. I. Catto and R. Evans (Oxford, 1992), 2:50,2:55-56, and 2:61-62; Conti, "Linguag-
gio e realta nel commento alle Categoric di Robert Alyngton," pp. 179-241 passim; A. De
Libera, "Questions de realisme. Sur deux arguments antiockhamistes de John Sharpe,"
Revue de metaphysique et de morale 97 (1992): 83-110.
8. Cf. N. W. Gilbert, "Ockham, Wyclif and the 'via moderna'," in Antiqui und
Moderni: Traditions-bewuβtsein und Fortschrittsbewuβtsein im spaten Mittelalter, ed. A.
Zimmermann Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9 (Berlin 1974), pp. 85-125; P. V. Spade, in J.
Wyclif, On Universals, pp. vii-xlvii; A. Kenny, Wyclif, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 1-30; Kenny,
"The Realism of the De Universalibus," in Wycliff in his Times, pp. 17-29; Kenny,
"Realism and Determinism in the early Wyclif," V. Herold, "Wyclifs Polemik gegen
Ockhams Auffassung der platonischen Ideen und ihr Nachklang in der tschechischen
hussitischen Philosophic," G. Leff, "The Place of Metaphysics in Wyclifs Theology," in
From Ockham to Wyclif, pp. 165-77, 185-215, 217-32; A. D. Conti, "Logica intensionale
e metafisica dell'essenza in John Wyclif," Bullettino delΓIstίtuto Storico Italiano per il
Medio EvoeArchivio Muratoriano, 99 (1993): 159-219. Among earlier studies the follow-
ing should be mentioned: M. H. Dziewicki, "An Essay on Wyclifs Philosophical System,"
in Johannis Wyclif Miscellanea Philosophica, l:v-xxvii; L. Baudry, "A propos de Guil-
laume d Ockham et de Wiclef," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littέraire du moyen-άge
14 (1939):231-51; Robson, Wyclif, pp. 141-70.
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counterpart of his doctrine of being. In the third and fourth sections I shall
discuss the metaphysical setting of Wyclif's logical machinery, focussing on
the twin problems of the composition of being and essence, and of the relation
between universals and individuals, as his formal distinction was chiefly needed
to give an effective tool for the solution of these issues. Finally, the fifth section
will deal with Wyclif's formal distinction in its historical development and con-
ceptual ramifications.
I. BEING AND TRUTH
A.
The point of departure of Wyclif's metaphysics is the notion of being (ens), as it
occupies the central place in his ontology. After Duns Scotus, the real issue was
the relationship between being and, on the other side, God and creatures, as
Scotus's theory of the univocity of the concept of being was an absolute novelty,
full of important consequences for the development of later medieval philosophy.9
Wyclif takes many aspects from Scotus' explanation, but he (1) stresses the
ontological implications of the Franciscan master's doctrine; (2) uses a little more
"traditional" conceptual machinery; and (3) reverses the relationship between ens
and verum. In fact, the general principle which leads him in his description of the
inner structure of the reality is that of the homology of philosophical language and
the world, according to which our thought spontaneously models itself on reality,
so that the contents and articulations of our ideas are fully objective.
Not only does Wyclif, like Scotus, claim that the notion of being is the most
general one, a notion entailed by all others—the main object of our intellect—he10
also states that being is an extra-mental reality predicated of everything (God and
creatures, substances and accidents, universal and individual essences) according
9. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, ed. Vaticana, 3:81-103; ed. 8, p. 1,
q. 3, ed. Vaticana, 4:171-229. On Scotus's theory of transcendentals see A. B. Wolter, The
Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Washington D.C.,
1946); L. Honnefelder, Ens in quantum ens. DerBegriffdes Seienden als solchen als Gegen-
stand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (1979; Munster, 1989); D.
C. Langston, "Scotus and Ockham on the Univocal Concept of Being," Franciscan Studies
39 (1979), pp. 105-29; S. P. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early
Works," Franciscan Studies 43 (1983): 347-95; S. D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Con-
cept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick," Me-
diaeval Studies 49 (1987): 1-75; O. Boulnois, "Analogie et univocite selon Duns Scot: la
double destruction," Les Etudesphilosophiques (1989): 347-69.
10. CF. De ente in communi, chap. 1, pp. 1-3: "In primis supponatur ens esse. Hoc
enim nee potest probari nee ignorari ab aliquo cognitivo. Ideo necesse est illud primo
supponere, cum ens esse in communi sit primo et maxime notum quoad distinctam noticiam
elicitam a quolibet tauter cognitivo. . . . Inpossibile est cognitivum quicquam tauter
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to different degrees, since God is in the proper sense of the term and any other
entity is (something real) only insofar as it shares the being of God.11 The
constitutive property of such realities is the capacity of being the object of a
complex act of signifying (omne ens estprίmarίe signabile per complexum).12 As
a consequence, Wyclif extends the set of referents of the term 'ens' to include in
addition to the categorical beings (entίa praedicamentalia): (1) the things existing
only in potentίa in their causes; (2) collections and groups of things, like villages,
towns, cities, lands, and religious orders; (3) states of affairs, both atomic and
molecular; (4) past and future states of affairs (praeteritίones and futuritiones),
not seen as res that have been real and will be real, but regarded as real in the
present as past and future truths; (5) the (molecular) states of affairs which are
signified by negative true sentences; (6) hypothetical and tautological truths; and
(7) such res as death, sin, and the false (falsίtas) itself.13
cognoscere vel scire, quod idem est, nisi sciat ad minimum illud esse, cum cognicio et
sciencia, si res est, sit prima possibilis, set eo ipso quod scit de aliquo ipsum esse, habet
noticiam transcendentis. . . . Ista enim convertuntur, ens et quod est, ut patet primo Phisi-
corum. Patet igitur, quod claudit contradiccionem quamquam actualiter vel habitudinaliter
cognoscere quicquam esse, nisi cognoscat proporcionaliter ens esse. . . . Cum ergo com-
munissimum possibile sit transcendens, sequitur, quod inpossibile est ante ipsum noticia
elicita aliquod inferius distincte cognoscere. Confirmatur per hoc quod unumquodque se
habet ad cognosci sicut se habet ad esse ex secundo Metaphisice, sed ens transcendens est
primum existens possibile. Ergo et primum cognoscibile. Si enim aliquod ens movet ad sui
noticiam, tune transcendens noscitur in illo. . . . Ideo indubie eadem sunt principia essendi
et cognoscendi. . . . Tanta igitur est communitas entis, quod nullus intellectus potest ferri
super non ens. Cum igitur intellectus sit communissima virtus possibilis, sequitur quod ens,
ejus objectum primum, sit communissimum cognoscibile potens esse"; De ente praedi-
camentali, chap. 1, pp. 2-3; De intelleccione Dei, chap. 5, pp. 97-98.
11. Cf. De ente in communί, chap. 2, p. 29: "Prioritatem enim nature, sicut et
essencialis maioritas perfectionis dicit maioritatem entitatis sic, quod proporcionaliter ut
aliquid est reliquo perfeccius est ipsum magis ens, ita, quod summe ens est Deus, et
gradatim alia, ut sunt ipso plus aut minus participancia—Deus enim, ut copiosius vel minus
copiose communicat bonitatem suam creaturis, quibus illabitur, facit eas proporcionabiliter
magis et minus entes. Ipse enim est metrum aliis, ut sint, et ut tante sint." See also: chap.
1, pp. 1-2; De ente praedicamentali, chap. 1, p. 13; chap. 4, p. 30; Tractatus de universali-
bus, chap. 4, p. 89; chap. 7, p. 130; chap. 12, p. 279; De intelleccione Dei, chap. 5, pp.
98-100; De materia et forma, chap. 6, p. 213.
12. Cf. De ente in communi, chap. 3, p. 36: "Ex istίs palam sequitur advertenti quod
omne ens est primarie ens signabile per complexum verum et econtra, et per consequens
communius quam est ens non est possibile quicquam esse. Prima pars patet ex hoc quod
omne ens esse est primarie signabile per complexum. Set omne ens est ens esse juxta
proximo dicta, igitur ilia pars vera. Non enim esset ens verum, nisi esset signabile per
complexum verum, set omne ens est verum, ut prius patet ex dictis, igitur et cetera. Et ex
istis elicitur quam amplum sit ens, quia tarn amplum sicut est primarie signabile per
complexum. Voco autem signabile quod habet aptitudinem ut significetur, ut est omne ens,
et patet quod omne ens est primarie signabile per complexum, quia omnis veritas est sic
signabilis: omne ens est veritas, igitur et cetera." Cf. De ente primo in communi, chap. 1,
p. 70.
13. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 1, pp. 2 and 5; Purgans errores circa veritates
in communi, chap. 1, pp. 1-2; chap. 3, pp. 10—11.
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This choice implies a revolution in the standard medieval theory of transcen-
dentals, since Wyclif actually replaces ens with verum. According to the common
belief, among the transcendentals {ens, res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum) being
was the primitive notion that all the others stemmed from by adding a specific
connotation in relation to something else, or some new determination. So verum
was nothing but the ens itself considered in relation to an intellect, no matter
whether divine or human. In Wyclif's view, on the contrary, being is no more the
main transcendental and its notion is not the first and simplest, but there is
something more basic to which being can be brought back: the veritas (or verum).
According to the English philosopher only what can be signified by a complex
expression is a being, and whatever is the proper object of an act of signifying is
a veritas. Truth is therefore the true name of being itself:
Some truths are per se in a category and others are not. It is of the latter that
philosophers are talking when they call them "notional entities." It is no
objection that one can have different thoughts of the same thing under differ-
ent aspects. Suppose I call to mind that Peter is an animal, so big, white, a
father, a begetter, tired, lying today in bed, rich—when I do all this I am
thinking of the ten categories, but in a complex manner as truths in my
thought. At other times I think of the same ten categories in a non-complex
manner. But these things are not altered because of the change in my thought;
they are the context of those aspects from which the changes between com-
plex and non-complex thought take their rise. All this is something that cannot
apply to God.14
In the Middle Ages there were three predominant approaches to the problem
of truth: ontological (proper to authors like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and
Grosseteste), epistemological (proper to authors like St. Thomas and Giles of
Rome), and linguistical (proper to nominalistic thinkers like Ockham and Buri-
dan). According to the first theory, truth is a thing's being in accordance with the
idea in the mind of God. According to the second, the true and the false are
properly not in things, but are about things, as the truth is the result of an act of
judgement of the intellect which states the combinations or separations found in
things themselves. According to the linguistical approach, defining truth is iden-
tical with indicating the rules for establishing the truth of propositions, since only
propositions are the bearers of truth-value. Wyclif's position derives from that of
Grosseteste, which he combines with his notion of being as significabile per
14. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7, p. 139 (Kenny's trans, pp. 54-55): "Nam
aliqua veritas est per se in genere et aliqua non. Et de ilia loquuntur philosophi vocantes
illam 'ens rationis'. Nee obest de eadem re secundum rationem disparem habere varium
intellectum, ut concipiendo Petrum esse animal, quantum, album, patrem generantem,
fatigatum in lecto hodie iacentem, divitem, intelligo decem genera sed complexe ut sunt
veritates apud considerationem meam. Et eadem decem praedicamenta alias intelligo
incomplexe. Nee variantur res illae propter variationem intellectus mei, sed circumstant
illas rationes ex quibus capitur variatio intellectus complexi et incomplexi, qui non potest
Deo competere."
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complexum.15 As a consequence, everything which is is a truth, and every truth is
not something simple, but complex. Absolute simpleness is unknown within
Wyclif 's world.
From the semantic point of view this means the collapsing of the fundamen-
tal distinction of the common Aristotelian theory of meaning, that between simple
signs (like nouns) and compound signs (like propositions).16 From the ontological
point of view this entails the uniqueness in type of the significata themselves of
every class of categorematic expressions.
A proposition, broadly speaking, is a being which signifies in a complex
manner. Therefore everything which is can be called a proposition, since
everything which is signifies in a complex manner that it is 'something
real'.1?
Within Wyclif's world it is the same (kind of) object which both concrete terms
and propositions refer to, as the individual substances have to be regarded as
(atomic) states of affairs. According to him, from the metaphysical point of view
a singular man (iste homo) is nothing but a real proposition (propositio realis),
where the actual existence in time as an individual (ista persona) plays the role of
the subject, the common nature, that is human nature (natura humana), plays the
role of the predicate, and the singular essence (essencίa istius hominis), that is
what by means of which this individual is a man, plays the role of the copula.18
B.
Despite appearances, Wyclif's opinion on this subject is not just a new formulation
of the theory of the complexe significabile.19 According to the supporters of the
15. On Grosseteste's theory of truth see S. P. Marrone, William of Auvergne and
Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton, 1983),
pp. 135-292.
16. Cf. Aristotle, Categories, chap. 2, la 16-19.
17. Logica, chap. 5, p. 14: "Proposicio large loquendo est ens complexe signifιcans\
et sic, quia omne quod est significat complexe se esse, omne quod est satis bene potest dici
proposicio."
18. Cf. Logica, chap. 5, p. 14: "Proposicio realis est, ut iste homo, iste lapis etc. quia
sicut in alia proposicione est subiectum et predicatum et copula, sic in isto homine est dare
istam personam, que est pars subiecta speciei humane, que est tamquam subiectum; et est
dare similiter naturam humanam, que essencialiter inest isti homini tamquam predicatum,
et realiter predicatur de isto homine. Et est dare essenciam istius hominis, que est realis
copula copulans istum hominem cum sua natura. Et sicut in proposicione artificiali predi-
catum dicitur de subiecto, sic in ista proposicione reali iste homo est essencialiter et realiter
natura humana."
19. On the medieval theory of the complexe significabile see H. Elie, Le complexe
significabile (Paris, 1936); J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt, 1972), pp. 148-68; G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam,
1973), pp. 177-280; F. Bottin, La scienza degli occamisti (Rimini, 1982), pp. 157-95.
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complexe significabile theory, the same res which are signified by simple concrete
terms are signified by complex expressions (or propositions).20 In Wyclif's
thought, on the contrary, there are no simple things in the world which correspond
to simple concrete terms, but simple concrete terms designate real propositions,
that is (atomic) states of affairs.
Wyclif derives this notion of real proposition from Walter Burley
(1275-1347), who had spoken of proposίtiones in re in his Quaestiones in lίbrum
Perihermeneias and in his last commentary on the Ars Vetus.21 Nevertheless, his
view is sensibly different from that of the Doctor Planus et Perspicuus. According
to Burley the propositiones in re are the sίgnificata of statements, just as individu-
als (both substantial ones and accidental ones) are the significata of discrete terms
and universal forms the significata of common abstract terms. In fact, Burley's
world consists of macro-objects, really existing outside the mind, each made up
by a primary substance and a host of substantial and accidental forms existing in
it and by it. Primary substances, substantial and accidental forms are simple
natures, belonging to ten different types of being, or categories. So the macro-ob-
ject (for example, Socrates or Coriscus) is not a primary substance (as it does not
contain the whole being of the macro-object), but an ordered congeries of cate-
gorical items. Within the macro-object Burley distinguishes two different definite
aspects of it: the aggregates and the propositiones in re (or states of affairs). The
former are what is signified by common accidental terms such as 'album', and the
latter what is signified by ordinary philosophical sentences such as (Sortes est
albus\ An aggregate is nothing but the union of one of the countless accidental
forms of a macro-object with its primary substance; and a real proposition is the
union of two forms of a macro-object (one of which must be substantial) with and
by means of the primary substance.22
Wyclif's real proposition is everything which is, as everything save God is
20. In this article I use the terms 'proposition', 'sentence', and 'statement' as if they
were synonymous terms, without distinguishing between what is expressed by a declarative
sentence when employed to make a statement and the declarative sentence itself.
21. See Burley, Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias (A.D. 1301), in S. F. Brown,
"Walter Burley's Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias," Franciscan Studies 34 (1974):
pp. 248-52; Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, Prol. and chap. De priori, and
Expositio super librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis, Prol. in Expositio super Artem Veterem
Porphyrii et Aristotelis (A.D. 1337) (Venetiis, 1509), fol. 17vb-18va, 47va, 48vb, 66ra-b.
On Walter Burley's life and works, see A. Una Juarez, Lafilosofia del siglo XIV. Contexto
cultural de Walter Burley (Madrid, 1978); on his logico-metaphysical theories see A. D.
Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's last Commentary on the Ars Vetus," Franciscan
Studies 50 (1990): 121-76.
22. This is trivially true not only for propositions in re such as hominem esse animal—
where the two forms connected are those of humanity and animality, and what unites them
is each individual substance which instantiates both of them—but also for propositions in
re such as Sortem esse hominem. In this case the two forms involved are the forma
perficiens materiam of Socrates (that is, his soul) and the correlated forma declarans
quidditatem (that is, the species homo). These two forms are really distinct from each other,
but connected together in Socrates himself.
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compound (at least oϊpotentia and actus),23 and therefore can be conceived of and
signified both in a complex (complexe) and in a non-complex manner (incom-
plexe).24 When one conceives of a thing in a complex manner one thinks of that
thing considered according to its metaphysical structure, and so according to its
many levels of being and kinds of essence.25 From this point of view, even the
abstract forms, like humanitas, are states of affairs, because of their own inner
organization and make up (for example, humanitas is equal to the "sum" of
animalίtas and rationalitas). As a consequence, one can refer to the same entity
by means of various types of term: abstract nouns (like 'humanitas'), concrete
nouns (like 'homo'), infinitive expressions (like 'hominem esse'), and complex
expressions (like 'humanitas communis', 'homo in communV, and 'species
hominis'), which therefore are synonymous.
Every universal is a form, a truth, or state of things capable of being signified
by a complex, just as being a man is a common nature in which all men, in
virtue of their species, resemble each other, and correspondingly with other
things. That is why professional philosophers have called universals by ab-
stract names, like 'humanity' 'equinity' and so on for other species. . . . So
someone who wants to be made acquainted with the quiddity of universals
has to think confusedly and abstractly, by genus and species, of the same thing
as he first thought of by means of a complex whose subject is the specific or
generic term; thus the species of man is the same as there being a man, the
genus of animal is the same thing as being an animal. And each of these is
common to its supposits.26
Wyclif's metaphysical world, like his physical world, consists of "atomic"
objects, that is single essences belonging to the ten different types or categories.27
These metaphysical "atoms" however are not simple, but composite, because they
are reducible to something else, belonging to a different rank of reality, and unable
to exist by itself: being and quίdditas, potentia and actus, matter and form, abstract
genera, species and differences. For that reason, everything which one can speak
about, or think of, is both a res and an atomic state of affairs, while every true
23. Cf. De ente praedicamentalί, chap. 5, pp. 38-39.
24. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, pp. 55-56; chap. 3, pp. 70, 74, and 84;
chap. 6, pp. 118-19.
25. On this topic see below the section on being and essence.
26. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 3, pp. 70 and 74 (Kenny's trans, pp. 19 and 21):
"Omne universale est forma, verίtas vel disposίtio significabile per complexum, ut esse
hominem est natura communis in qua omnes homines specifice conveniunt, et correspon-
denter de aliis. Unde periti philosophantes vocaverunt universalia nominibus abstractis, ut
'humanitas', 'equinitas', et ita de aliis speciebus.. . . Volens igitur manuduci in notitiam de
quidditate universalium debet intelligere confuse et abstracte idem per genus et speciem
quod intelligit primo per complexum, cuius subiectum est terminus specificus vel terminus
generis, ut idem est species hominis et hominem esse, idem genus animalis et esse animal.
Et utrumque illorum est commune suis suppositis."
27. Cf. Continuatio logicae, tr. 3, chap. 9, pp. 60-63, and 80. On Wyclif's atomism
see Kenny, Wyclif, pp. 4-5, and 62.
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sentence expresses a molecular state of affairs, that is the union (if the sentence is
affirmative) or the separation (if the sentence is negative) of two (or more) atomic
objects.
II. ANALOGY
A.
If being is a reality, it is then clear that it is impossible to affirm its univocity. The
Doctor Subtilis thought of being as simply a concept, therefore he could describe
it as univocal in a broad sense (one name—one concept—many natures). Wyclif,
on the contrary, is convinced that the ens in communi is an extra-mental reality, so
he works out his theory at a different level in relation to Scotus: no more at the
intensional level (the ratio connected with the univocal sign, or univocum univo-
cans), but at the extensional one (the res signified by the mental sign, considered
as shared by different entities according to different degrees). For that reason, he
cannot utilize Aristotelian univocation, which hides these differences in sharing.
He prefers to use one of the traditional notions of analogy,28 since the being of
God is the measure of the being of the other things ("Ipse enim est metrum aliis,
ut sint, et ut tante sint"), which are drawn up in a scale with the separate
substances at top and matter at bottom.29 Therefore he qualifies being as a genus
ambiguum30 borrowing an expression already used by Grosseteste in his com-
mentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.31
28. Cf. De ente praedicamentalU chap. 3, p. 25: "Constat namque ex predictis, quod
esse generativum est analogum, et constabit, quod nee ens in sua maxima communitate, nee
accidens est genus logicum, 'scilicet natura positiva multis speciebus univoce communi-
cata,' cuius potissima causa est analogia." On analogy in Middle Ages, see: C. Fabro, La
nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo son Tommaso d Aquino 2d ed. (Torino,
1950); H. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World. An Investigation of its
Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala, 1953); R. M.
Mclnerny, The Logic of Analogy. An Interpretation ofSt Thomas (The Hague, 1961); B.
Montagnes, La doctrine de Γanalogie de Γetre d'apres Saint Thomas dAquin (Louvain-
Paris, 1963); R. M. Mclnerny, Studies in Analogy (The Hague, 1968); E. J. Ashworth,
"Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas
on Analogy," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): pp. 39-67; EAD., "Equivoca-
tion and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan," in Historia
Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, ed. B.
Mojsisch and O. Pluta (Amsterdam, 1991), pp. 23-43; EAD., "Analogy and Equivocation
in Thirteenth Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 94-135;
EAD., "Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation in Some Early Fourteenth Century
Authors," in Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages (Turnhout, 1996), pp. 233-47.
29. Cf. De ente praedicamentalU chap. 3, p. 29.
30. Cf. De ente praedicamentalU p. 25.
31. Cf. Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarίus in Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, I,
chap. 5, ed. P. Rossi (Firenze, 1981), pp. 118-19.
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Wyclif's denying the univocity of being32 does not mean, however, that the
analogy of being implies an ordered multiplicity of meanings, as in Thomas
Aquinas33 or in Thomas Sutton.34 Since Wyclif hypostatizes the notion of being
and considers equivocity, analogy, and univocity as real relations between things,
and not as semantical relations between terms and things,35 his analogy is partially
equivalent to the standard Aristotelian univocity. In fact, according to the common
interpretation of the opening passage of the Categories,36 equivocal terms are
correlated with more than one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing
different natures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only one concept and
refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same nature. Within Wyclif's
system, what differentiates analogy from univocity is the way by which a certain
nature (or property) is shared by a set of things: the analoga share it secundum
magis et minus (or secundum prius et posterius), the univoca share it all in the
same manner and at the same degree of "intensity." This is the true sense of his
distinction between genera ambigua (such as ens and accidens) and genera logica
(such as substantiά)31
Wyclif admits three main types of equivocity: by chance (a casύ), analogical
(which is similar to the standard deliberate equivocity),38 and generic—only the
generic one compatible with the univocity proper to the genera logica. Equivocals
by chance are those things to which it happens that they have the same name, but
with different meanings and/or reasons for imposition. Those things are analogical
32. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 3, p. 27.
33. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent, d. 19, a. 5, a. 2.
34. Cf. Thomas Sutton, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 32 and q. 33, ed. J. Schneider
(Munchen, 1977), pp. 882, 917-18, and 924.
35. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 2, p. 15: "Ideo certum est, quod descripcio
Aristotelis de equivocis, univocis et denominativis consonat rebus extra, que dicuntur
equovoca secundum istas raciones et consequenter nominibus rerum, ut dictum est de
universalitate, . . . Certum est, quod est dare res ad extra, quarum alique equivoce, alique
univoce et alique denominative competunt subiectis; et ille supponuntur esse equivoca,
univoca et denominativa, et consequenter racione illorum signa dicuntur similitudine
equivoca et univoca."
36. Cf. Aristotle, Categories, chap. 1, la 1-12.
37. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 3, p. 27, and chap. 4, pp. 30 and 32.
38. The division of the equivocals into aequivoca a casu and aequivoca a consilio is
due to the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle. It was introduced into the Latin world
by Boethius (see his commentary on the Categories, chap. De aequivocis, in P. L, vol. 64,
col. 166B-C). The semantical structure of the two groups of equivocals is the same (one
name, many concepts, many natures), but in the case of the deliberate equivocals concepts
(and therefore natures) are related to each other, so there is some (good) reason for the
homonymy. In the late Middle Ages a new kind of deliberate equivocity was worked out,
much more similar to Aristotelian univocity than to the standard Neoplatonic deliberate
equivocity, and substantially identical to analogy by priority and posteriority (per prius et
posterius), as it was based on the following semantical structure: one name, one concept,
one nature, but shared according to different ways. See Ashworth, "Analogy, Univocation,
and Equivocation in Some Early Fourteenth Century Authors," pp. 233-47, esp. pp.
236-42.
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which have the same name and are subordinated to a single concept, but according
to different ways. Analogical things therefore share the nature signified by that
name according to various degrees of intensity. For this reason they differ from
generic equivocals, which share the same generic nature in the same way, but have
distinct specific natures.39 Wyclif appears to depend here on Burley's last commen-
tary on the Physics, where the Doctor Planus et Perspicuus affirms that the term
'being' is at the same time univocal and equivocal. It is univocal broadly speaking
as a single concept is associated with it; it is equivocal, but not most strictly, because
the categorical beings "share" the concept in different ways: directly substances and
secondarily accidents.40 Unlike Burley, Wyclif hypostatizes the notion of being,
and does not seem to allow a distinction between deliberate equivocity using two
concepts and the kind of equivocity which involves only a concept. On the other
hand, he keeps the same explanatory scheme, since he also confines the Aristotelian
definition of equivocity to chance equivocity and considers the other forms of
equivocity as equivalent to the Aristotelian univocity.
According to this account, the ens in communi is the basic component of the
metaphysical structure of each reality, which possess it in accordance with its own
nature, value, and position in the hierarchy of created beings.
B.
Unfortunately Wyclif's theory is weak in an important point: he does not clarify
the relation between the ens in communi and God. On the one hand, being is a
creature, the first of all the creatures,41 on the other hand, God should share it, as
(1) being is the most common reality, predicated of all, and (2) according to Wyclif
to-be-predicated-of something means to-be-shared-by it.42 As a consequence, a
creature would in some way be superior to God.
39. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 2, pp. 16-17, 18-19, and 21: "Tercio notan-
dum, quod tres sunt gradus equivocacionis et univocacionis, et per consequens equivocum
et univocum contingit in eodem analogo suis gradibus convenire. Quoddam enim est
equivocum sine analoga conveniencia equivocatorum in illo equivoco, ut casualiter vocatur
unus homo propria nominacione Felix, et alius, quia beatus, dicitur felix; nee est aliqua
analogia vel commune proprie intencionis conveniens illis, secundum quod uterque dicitur
felix, et taliter sepe contingit in nominibus propriis. . . . In secundo gradu equivocatorum
sunt analoga, sive secundum esse, sive secundum operacionem vel aliam proprietatem
accidentalem, ut ens contingit analoyce substancie et accidenti, cum substancia sit per se
ens; et accidens est ens, quia substancie formaliter inheret, et talis analogia est inter Deum
et quodcumque causatum, inter ydeam et ydeatum, et breviter inter quodcumque ens
intelligibile et actuale causatum extra Deum est talis analogia secundum operacionem
proporcionalem In tercio gradu sunt omnia genera, ut innuit Aristoteles VII Phisicorum
31°, ubi dicit genus esse tacenter equivocum."
40. Cf. Burley, Expositio in libros octo Physicorum, I, tr. 2, chap. 1 (Venetiis, 1501),
fols. 12vb-13ra.
41. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 5, appendix prior, p. 44; Tractatus de univer-
salibus, chap. 6, p. 122.
42. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, p. 17.
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A few years after Wyclif 's death, two authors influenced by his philosophical
thought, William Penbygull and Johannes Sharpe, tried to solve this aporia.
Penbygull,43 whose metaphysical system is closer to that of Wyclif, denies that the
property of being more general implies natural priority. According to him being is
a more general reality than God, and so superior to Him, but in spite of this fact
God is clearly naturally prior and infinitely more perfect than it.
Sharpe,44 distinguishes between communicatio (that is, generality) and par-
ticipatio (that is, ontological participation). He considers the latter simply as a
sub-case of the former, since according to him a reality x is shared (that is,
participated) by a reality y iff: (a) x is more general than y, and (b) x is the cause
of y. Therefore, being would be more general than God, but its reality is not shared
by Him, as the ens in communi is not the cause of God.
III. BEING AND ESSENCE
A.
Among the many kinds of entia that Wyclif lists the most important set is that
consisting of categorical beings. They are characterized by the double fact of
having a nature, and of being the constitutive elements of finite corporeal beings
(or atomic states of affairs).45
Because of the complexity of their metaphysical structure finite corporeal
beings have a four-fold level of reality (esse)46 The first one is the eternal mental
being (esse ideale) that every creature has in God, as an object of His mind. The
second one is the potential being that everything has in its causes, both universal
(genus, species) and particular. It is closely connected with the nature of the
individual substance on which the finite corporeal being is founded, and is inde-
pendent of its actual existence. It is called 'esse essentiae' or 'esse in genere'. The
third one is just the actual existence in time as an earthly res.47 The fourth one is
the accidental being (modus essendi accidentalis substantiae) caused in a sub-
stance by the inhering in it of its appropriate accidental forms.
43. Cf. Penbygull, De universalibus, in Conti, "Teoria degli universali e analisi della
predicazione," pp. 200-1.
44. Cf. Johannes Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, pp. 11 and 106-10.
45. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 1, pp. 1-6.
46. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7, pp. 126-28. In the De intelleccione Dei,
chap. 5, pp. 101-2 on the contrary, Wyclif speaks of a three-fold level of reality, as in this
work he equates esse existere with esse accidentale—on this topic, see G. Leff, Heresy, pp.
502-3.
47. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7, p. 127: "Tertio habet creatura esse existere
individuum, secundum quod esse incipit et corrumpitur pro suo tempore. Et solum illud
esse acceptant moderni doctores. . . . Aliud enim est esse et aliud existere."
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As the first level of being just mentioned has no distinct reality from God,
since it is realίter God himself, the main level of being proper of a res is the second
one, the esse essentiae, which causes a thing to be what it is.
The categorical items conceived of as instances of a certain kind of being are
called by Wyclif 'essentiae'. An essence therefore is a being which has a well
defined nature, even if the name 'essence' does not make this nature known:
I therefore assume that the name 'essence' is a common name which signifies
a nature as determined by a substantial or accidental quality whatsoever. . . .
But "the name 'essence'" does not say what a thing is; it only says that a thing
is—which is the first inquiry about a thing, according to the second book of
the Posterior Analytics.^
So 'essentia' is a term less general than 'ens', but more general than 'quid-
ditas', since (1) every essence is a being, and not every being is an essence, and
(2) every quiddity is an essence, and not every essence is a quiddity, as individual
things are essences, but they are not quiddities.
In his Tractatus de universalibus49 Wyclif, speaking of the items of the
category of substance, distinguishes between singular essence and universal es-
sence {essentia quidditativa speciei vel generis). The essentia singularis is the
form which in union with the matter brings the substantial composite about. The
universal essence is the type that the former instantiates; it is present in the
substantia singularis as a contitutive part of its nature, and it discloses the inner
metaphysical structure of the substantial composite.50
B.
In view of his position on the problem of being, Wyclif maintains no real distinc-
tion between essence and being.51 Since being is a genus ambiguum, it is the stuff
that the ten categories modulate according to their own nature, so that everything
is immediately something which is.52 The essences of creatures do not precede
48. De materia et forma, chap. 4, pp. 185-86: "Suppono igitur quod nomen essencie
sit commune ad significandum naturam, quacunque qualitate substanciali vel accidentali
qualiiΊcatam. . . . Non autem dicit, quid res est, sed solum dicit quod est, que est prima
questio de re, ex secundo PosteriorumΓ Cf. also De ente primo in communi, chap. 3, pp.
88-89; De ente praedicamentali, chap. 5, p. 43; Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7, pp.
128-29.
49. See Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 6, pp. 116-24, passim.
50. It is evident that Wyclif is (re)formulating here the distinction between forma
partis and forma totius which goes back to Albert the Great.
51. On the problema of the distinction between essence and being in Wyclif, see A.
Kenny, Wyclif, pp. 21-22; A. D. Conti, "Essenza ed essere nel pensiero della tarda scolas-
tica," Medioevo 15 (1989): pp. 244-51; Conti, "Logica intensionale", pp. 171-81.
52. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 4, p. 30; Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7,
p. 130.
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their beings, not even causally, as every thing is (identical with) its essence. The
being of a thing is brought into existence by God at the same instant as its essence,
since essence without being and being without essence would be self-contradic-
tory states of affairs.53 In fact, essence without being would imply that an individ-
ual could be something of a given type without being real in any way, and being
without essence would imply that there could be the existence of a thing without
the thing itself.
As a consequence, the pars destruens of his theory on being and essence is
a strong refutation of the twin opinions of St. Thomas and Giles of Rome.
Although Wyclif does not name either the Dominican master or the Augustinian
one, it is nevertheless clear from the context that their conceptions are the object
of his criticisms.
St. Thomas54 had postulated a real composition of essence and esse in
creatures, in order to account for the dependence of the world upon God at a
merely philosophical level. He thought that because the essence of a creature
receives its being from God, essence and being are distinct from each other, but
related one to the other just as potency (essence) and act (being). Giles pursued
the same line of thought, as he admitted a distinction between essence and being
as between res and res.55
Wyclif objects to Aquinas that his theory is selfcontradictory.56 In fact, if
53. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 6, pp. 122-23: "Patet quod essentiae crea-
turarum non praecedunt causaliter sua esse, etsi loquamur de esse intelligibili rerum quod
est essentia divina; patet quod etiam ipsae res sunt eadem essentia. Et sic est aequaevitas
essentiae cuiuscumque rei et sui esse. . . . Videtur quod esse eorum ex aequo ponitur cum
sua essentia, cum Deus non potest ponere essentiam, nisi ponat ipsam esse, cum ille sit
necessario primus actus naturae divinae, quae est purum esse cuius participatione omne
aliud habet esse. Ex istis videtur quod omne esse est essentia et econtra. . . . Confirmatur
sic: omne ens est esse. Omnis essentia est ens. Igitur omnis essentia est esse. Minor patet
ex hoc quod multa habent esse quae non habent formaliter essentias, ut patet de priva-
tionibus et peccatis ac de aliis veritatibus extra genus. Ideo, ens est superius essentia."
54. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, chap. 4, ed. M. D. Roland-Gosselin
(Paris 1948), pp. 34-35; In I Sent, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3; d. 19, q. 2, a. 2; In II Sent, d. 1, q. 1,
a. 1; De veritate, q. 27, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles I, chap. 22, and II, chaps. 52 and 54;
Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 4; q. 8, a. 1; q. 50, a. 2; q. 75, a. 5; Sententia super
Metaphysicam, book IV, lectio 2, ed. R. Spiazzi (Taurini-Romae 1950), nn.549-53 and 558.
55. Cf. Giles of Rome, Theoremata de esse et essentia, th. 16, and th. 19, in E.
Hocedez, Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia (Louvain, 1930), pp. 101, 127,
134; Quaestiones de esse et essentia (Venetiis, 1503), q. 9, fol. 20vb; q. 11, fol. 24vb; q.
12, fols. 27rb-29ra.
56. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 6, pp. 121-22: "Cum esse sit actus essentiae,
patet quod nullo modo praecedit sed potius sequitur suam essentiam cuius est proprium
esse, sicut dicunt loquentes in ista materia. Sit igitur A creata essentia et B eius esse
formaliter consequens, sed posterius origine vel natura. Et patet quod Deus scit A esse pro
illo gradu prioritatis super B, quia aliter non foret verum quod A est prius B. Ex quo
sequitur quod A habet esse pro illo gradu prioritatis. Quaero igitur: Utrum illud esse sit B
vel esse prius B? Si B, sequitur oppositum dati. Si esse prius B, tune B est esse accidentale
adveniens enti in actu. Consequens iterum contra datum, quia supponitur quod B sit esse
substantiale primum quod habet A post esse intelligibile aeternum."
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being is the act peculiar to essence, being is logically posterior to essence.
Therefore, given a created essence A and its own act of existing B, since A is
logically prior to B, A should have acquired being prior to B's having affected A.
We can consider this new being of A we have found, and wonder whether it is
identical with B or not. If it is, then B is not posterior to A—a result which is in
contradiction with the necessary consequence of our assumption. If it is distinct
from B, it is prior to B; and then B is accidental in relation to A—an outcome
which is in contradiction with our assumption.
As far as Giles's formulation of the theory is concerned, Wyclif observes that
if a creature (homo) and its being (hominem esse) are really distinct as thing and
thing, then (1) they differ as two individual substances, and so they are mutually
independent, or (2) one of them is naturally prior to the other, and so one entails
the other (without being entailed). Both consequences are false, because they
contradict the truth that an essence and its being reciprocally imply each other,
like a thing and the fact that it is real.57 The essence of a res is therefore really
(realiter) identical with its being.
C.
Because of the complexity of the metaphysical composition of the finite corporeal
being, such an affirmation is insufficient for answering the question concerning
the relationship between essence and being. As every creature has two different
kinds of essence and four levels of being, the identity between essence and being
cannot be complete; consequently Wyclif speaks of a formal difference (distinctio
or differentia formalis)—that he calls also 'difference of reason' (distinctio ra-
57. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 6. pp. 120-21: "Si homo et hominem esse
simpliciter distinguuntur, tune vel sunt omnino distincta ut duo supposita separata, sicut
Petrus et Paulus, vel aliter se habent in quodam ordine naturali. Et per eonsequens vel sunt
aequeprimo natura, vel unum prius et reliquum posterius. Primo modo non potest poni, cum
tune essent impertinentia et neutrum sequens ad reliquum. Quod est notorie falsum, cum
formaliter mutuo se inferunt. Si secundo modo, tune oportet quod hominem esse, quod sit
A, sit prius quam homo, quod sit B, vel econtra, cum impossibile sit duo poni in eodem
gradu numero ordinis naturae . . . Sed non potest poni quod A sit posterius B, quia tune A
esset accidentale homini, et, per eonsequens, praesupponeret hominem. Et cum nihil
praesupponit hominem, nisi quod praesupponit eum in existentia, sequitur quod A prasup-
poneret hominem in existentia. Consequens falsum, cum A sit simpliciter hominem exis-
tere. Igitur, non praesupponit hominem exίstere. Nee requirit ad hoc quod ipsum sit
hominem esse cum sit hominem esse, nee econtra homo praesupponit hominem esse, quia
nee quoad consequentiam nee quoad causam. Non quoad consequentiam cum mutuo
formaliter se inferunt, nee quoad causam quia tune ex hoc quod est ita quod homo est, homo
est. Et sic foret reciprocatio causarum in eadem linea naturae in infinitum, quod est
impossibile, cum in mutuo se inferentibus illud quod est simplicius est causaliter prius. Et
per consequens prius foret homo quam hominem esse si distinguuntur. Quod notum est esse
falsum, cum hominem esse nee potest poni passio hominis nee aliquod novem generum
accidentis."
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tionίs)—between essence and being in creatures. In fact, from the extensional
point of view, being and essence of creatures are equipollent, as every being is an
essence and vice versa; but, from the intensional point of view, there is a formal
difference, since the being of a thing presupposes its essence and not vice versa.5*
More precisely, he holds that (1) the esse ideale is formally distinct from the
singular essence; (2) the actual existence is formally distinct from the universal
essence; and (3) the singular essence is formally distinct from the actual existence.
Every creature has many kinds of being, at least one of which is distinct from
essence. Take a given Peter: it is certain that his ideal being is distinct from
his particular essence. And again his particular existence, which is the being
of existence and being thus and so, is distinct from his quidditative essence
in species or genus. And so with other cases.... It is clear that Aristotle spoke
truly when he said that the existence of a particular is distinct from its essence
or quiddity; I myself think that this is true even of the angels. But the difficult
point is whether the particular essence and its existence are distinct. The
Solemn Doctor seems to say that they are, just as light and shining are distinct
from each other.... And this opinion seems to have greater plausibility when
you take essence not as it is often taken, for the quiddity of things, but for
essential being preceding the quiddity of a thing. . . . In such cases therefore
there is a mental distinction.59
The reasons for the first two distinctions are evident; however, the last one is
problematic, if one takes into account the real identity of being and essence. The
key to the solution of this problem lies in the fact that Wyclif establishes a close
connection between singular essence and essential being,6 0 on the one hand, and
a real identity between universal and individual (that is, between universal essence
58. Cf. De materίa et forma, chap. 4, pp. 184-185: "In qualibet autem creatura est
distinccio, saltern racionis, inter esse et essenciam, . . . Ideo dicunt quod essencia, ens et
esse differunt secundum racionem, sicut lux, lucens et lucere. Quidquid autem sit de hoc
exemplo et sensu concedendum de esse et essencia, videtur mihi quod omne esse sit
essencia, et econtra; distingwunter tamen secundum racionem in creaturis, cum esse habi-
tum per formam aut racionem specialem alicuius generis presupponit essenciam, et non
econtra; cum esse contracte dicit huiusmodi racionem. Exemplum est de specie et indi-
viduo, que distingwuntur secundum racionem incommunicabilitatis, tamen omnis species
est individuum, et econtra."
59. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7, pp. 128-30 (Kenny's trans, pp. 49-50):
"Quaelibet creatura habet multa esse quorum aliquod et essentia distinguuntur; ut notato
Petro certum est quod esse suum ideale distinguitur a sua essentia singulari. Et iterum
existentia singularis, quae est esse existere et sic esse, distinguitur a sua essentia quiddita-
tiva speciei vel generis. Et ita de aliis. . . . Et patet quod Aristoteles verum dicit quod esse
existere singularis et sua essentia vel quidditas distinguuntur—quod ego credo esse verum
de angelis. Sed difficultas est utrum essentia singularis et suum existere distinguuntur. Et
videtur Doctorem Solemnem dicere quod sic, . . . Et ista sententia videtur habere maiorem
colorem intelligendo essentiam non pro quidditate rei ut saepe sumitur, sed pro esse
essentiali praecedente quidditatem rei. . . . Est igitur in talibus distinctio rationis."
60. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 7, p. 131.
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and singular essence), on the other hand. The esse essentiale is the level of being
which matches singular essence, while the actual existence is in a certain way
accidental to the essentia singularis, as the latter is nothing else but the essentia
quidditativa speciei considered as informing matter.
D.
Wyclif 's view can be summarized in three main theses, which were taken up by
some fifteenth century authors: (1) the extension of the range of the notion of
being; (2) the sharp distinction between being and existence, as the former is the
universal condition of every kind of reality and the latter the mode of being
peculiar to individual substances; (3) the assimilation of the distinction between
essence and being to the distinction between universal and singular.61 This last
point is linked to the core of Wyclif's metaphysics, that is his theory of universals,
and it cannot be properly understood without knowing his position on this topic,
which therefore needs to be investigated thoroughly now.
IV. UNIVERSALS, INDIVIDUALS, AND PREDICATION
A.
The English master presents his opinion62 as intermediate between those of St.
Thomas (and Giles of Rome) and Walter Burley.
Thus, some say that every substance is particular, and is universal only by
being apprehended universally; just as an artifact is called human, on the basis
of a humanity outside itself, and a thing seen, or understood, or otherwise
described on the basis of something outside itself. And this opinion is attrib-
uted to St. Thomas, Giles and many others. The second way says that the
universal is not any of its particulars since it is contrasted with a particular
because it is common, or shared, or predicable, and is prior by nature and
imperceptible by senses and different in many other ways. . . . And this
opinion seems to have been held by Master Walter Burleigh and many
others.... I, for my part, take a middle way, reconciling the extremes; I agree
61. Cf. for instance Paul of Venice, Summa philosophiae naturalis, pars vi, cap. 1, ed.
(Venetiis, 1503), fol. 92vb-93va. On this subject see Conti, Esistenza e verity pp. 165-78.
62. On Wyclif's theory of universals see P. V. Spade, intro. in John Wyclif, On
Universals, pp. xviii-xx; A. Kenny, Wyclif, pp. 7-17; A. D. Conti, "Logica intensionale,"
pp. 181-89; A. De Libera, La querelle des universaux (Paris, 1996), pp. 407-11, whose
analyses substantially coincide with what I have said in my "Studio storico-critico," in
Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, pp. 298-305.
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with the first opinion that every universal is particular, and vice versa though
the two are formally distinct from each other.63
Like Giles,64 whom he quotes by name, Wyclif recognizes three main kinds of
universals: (1) ante rem, or ideal universals, that is the ideas in God, archetypes
of all that there is; (2) in re, or formal universals, that is the common natures
shared by individual things; and (3) post rem, or intentional universals, that is
mental signs by which we refer to the universals in re.65 The ideas in God are the
causes of the formal universals, and the formal universals are the causes of the
intentional universals.66 On the other hand, just like Burley, Wyclif holds that
formal universals exist in actu outside our minds; and not in potentia, as "moder-
ate" realists thought—even if, unlike the Doctor Planus et Perspicuus, he main-
tains that they are really identical with their own individuals.67
In addition to this partition of universals, standard in the Middle Ages, Wyclif
introduces another one, which was very successful among his followers, based on
the different functions that universal essences perform.68 He divides universal
into: (1) universals by causality (causatione); (2) universals by community (com-
municatione); and (3) universals by representation (repraesentatione).69 Anything
which can bring about several effects is a universal by causality; any essence
shared by many things at once is a universal by community; and any sign of the
63. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 4, pp. 86-87 (Kenny's trans, pp. 27-28): "Ut
aliqui dicunt quod ominis substantia est singularis et, ut universaliter apprehenditur, est
universalis, sicut opus dicitur humanum et res visa, intellecta vel aliter extrinsece denomi-
nata ab humanitate, visione et intellectione extra opus. Et ista sententia imponitur Sancto
Thomae, Aegidio et multis aliis. Secunda via dicit quod universale non est aliquod suorum
singularium, cum communicabilitate, participatione vel praedicabilitate, prioritate naturae,
insensibilitate et quotlibet aliis differentiis distinguatur ex opposito a singulari.. . . Et illius
opinionis videtur fuisse Magister Burleigh et multi alii. . . . Ego autem per medium incedo
concordando extrema, et concedo cum prima opinione quod omne universale est singulare
et econtra, licet distinguantur formaliter ab invicem." On Burley's theory of universals in
its historical developments from the traditional approach of the commentary on the De
anima to the extreme theses of his last works, see Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last
Commentary on the Ars Vetus," pp. 136-45.
64. Cf. Giles of Rome, Super librum I Sententiarum, d 19, p. 2, q. 1 (Venetiis, 1521),
fol. 11 Ova.
65. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, p. 69.
66. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, p. 65.
67. Cf. De ente in communi, chap. 5, p. 58.
68. Cf. for instance J. Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, pp. 49-50; W. Penbygull,
De universalibus, p. 178; William Milverley, Compendium de quinque universalibus, ms.
Oxford, Corpus Christi College 103, fol. 32v (transcription in Sharpe, Quaestio super
universalia, Appendix ii, p. 159); and Roger Whelpdale, Tractatus de universalibus, ms.
London, British Library, Harley 2178, fols. lOOvb-lOlra (transcription in Sharpe, Quaestio
super universalia, Appendix iv, p. 189)—but each of these authors speak of universals
praedicatione instead of communicatione.
69. Cf. De logica, p. 8; De ente in communi, chap. 4, pp. 54-55, where he speaks of
universals signacione instead of repraesentatione', and Tractatus de universalibus, ch. 1,
pp. 15-16.
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universals communίcatione is a universal by representation.70 The first two kinds
of universals are such in a strict sense, whereas the universals of the third kind are
universals in an equivocal sense, only in so far as they refer to the "real" univer-
sals:
There are three kinds of universal in general. The first is universal by causal-
ity, in the way that the most universal cause is God, and after him created
universal things in accordance with the order in which they take their origin
from God. The second is universal by community, a thing, for instance, shared
by many supposits, such as human nature and other general and specific
natures. The third is universal by representation, like the signs for the univer-
sals already mentioned, which are called universals by analogy in the way in
which a picture of a man is by analogy called a man.71
Since this division is based on the different functions a universal essence can
accomplish, its principles are not mutually exclusive; one and the same universal
can be placed into two (or more) branches of the classification at the same
time—as in the case of God, who, according to Wyclif, can be considered a
universal by causality and by representation.72 Moreover, it is clear that: (1) the
universals ante rem and post rem of the first division are universals by repre-
sentation; (2) the universals in re are universals by community; (3) all the genera
and species belonging to the ten categories, which are universals by community,
are universals by causality too, as they are causes of their own individuals.73 This
last statement sheds light on the problem of the ontological status of the formal
universals and their relations with the individuals.
70. I assume that the universals by representation are universals, only qua signs for
the universals by community (and not even by causality) as this is clearly stated in De ente
in communi, chap. 4, p. 55. I therefore do not agree with Spade (intro. in Wyclif, On
Universals, p. xviii, and n. 22), who thinks of this "restriction" as arbitrary and pointless.
On the contrary, within Wyclif's theory of language, this restriction is necessary in order to
distinguish between discrete and common terms. For the English philosopher, only those
terms which signify a common essence are common signs, as terms are divided according
to the objects they signify—logic being closely connected with ontology (cf. Tractatus de
universalibus, chap. 2, p. 56). It is however a fact that the group of the universals by
causality is a sub-set of the universals by community.
71. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, pp. 15-16 (Kenny's trans, p. 1): "Triplex est
maneries universalium in genere. Primum est universale causatione, ut Deus est causa
universalissima et post eum res universales creatae secunάum ordinem, quo oήginantur a
Deo. Secundum est universale communicatione, ut puta res communicata multis suppositis,
ut natura humana et aliae naturae generates et specificae. Tertium est universale repraesen-
tatione, ut signa priorum universalium quae aequivoce dicuntur universalia, sicut homo
pictus aequivoce dicitur homo."
72. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, p. 16.
73. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, p. 16: "Species etiam et genera sunt
objecta intellectus, causantia nedum scίentiam, sed omnes creaturas singulares."
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B.
According to Wyclif, who depends on Avicenna,74 the formal universals are
common natures, or veritates, in virtue of which the individuals that share them
are exactly what they are—just as the human species is the truth or form by which
every man formally is a man.75 Qua natures, they are prior, and so "indifferent"
to any division into universals and individuals. Universality (universalitas or
communicabilitas) is as it were their inseparable property {quasi passio) and not
a constitutive mark of the nature itself.76
As a consequence, the formal universals can be conceived of in two different
manners: as first intentions, or as second intentions. In the first case, they are
natures of a certain kind and are identical with their own individuals (for example,
homo is the same thing as Socrates). In the second case, they are properly
universals (that is something that can exist in many things and can be shared by
them), and distinct from their own individuals— considered qua individuals—be-
cause of the opposite constitutive principles: communicabilitas for universals and
incommunicabilitas for individuals. As a consequence, universals are really {re-
aliter) identical-to, but formally (formaliter) distinct from their individuals.77 In
fact, universals are formal causes in relation to their own individuals, and indi-
viduals material causes in relation to their universals, since individuals are partes
subiectivae of the universals.78
Thus three different kinds of entities can be qualified as formal universals:
(1) the common natures instantiated by individuals—which are things of first
intention; (2) the form itself of universality which belongs to a certain common
nature when seen in its relation to the individuals—which is a thing of second
intention; (3) the thinkability proper to the common nature, by which it is a
possible object of our mind:
In an analogous manner 'universal', interpreted formally, says three things:
first the nature, which is a thing of first intention, secondly the possibility of
being common to, or being predicated of many supposits, which is a thing of
second intention; and thirdly the thinkability which is proper to the intellect,
since a universal thing is uniquely thinkable in so far as it is non-sensible by
a bodily sense.79
74. Cf. Avicenna, Logica (Venetiis, 1508), fol. 12va; Liber de philosophia prima, tr.
5, chap. 1, ed. S. Van Riet 2 vols. (Louvain-Leiden, 1977-1980), pp. 228-29.
75. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 3, p. 84; and chap. 8, pp. 180-81.
76. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 12, p. 276.
77. Cf. De ente praedicamentali, chap. 5, appendix posterior, p. 46; Purgans errores
circa universalia in communi, chap. 4, pp. 37-38; and Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2,
pp. 62-63; chap. 4, pp. 86-87; chap. 10, pp. 208-13. See also De logica, chap. 2, pp. 8-10,
where Wyclif explains how the five Porphyrian praedicabilia derive from the communica-
bilitas.
78. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 10, p. 211.
79. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, p. 64 (Kenny's trans, pp. 15-16): "Correspon-
denter 'unίversale', formaliter intellectum, dicit tria: primo naturam quae est res primae
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c.
Wyclif accepts the traditional realistic account of the relationship between univer-
sals and individuals, and improves it by defining more accurately its logical struc-
ture. The formulation he adopts—universals and individuals are really the same,
but formally distinct— is only another way of saying that universals and individuals
are the same identical things if conceived as first intentions, and differ from each
other if conceived as second intentions—a thesis already found in Albert the Great's
works.80 According to Wyclif, universals and individuals are realiter the same, but
formaliter distinct since they share the same empirical reality—that of individu-
als—but considered as universals and individuals they have opposite constituent
principles: communicabilitas and incommunicabilitas respectively.
On the logical side, this means that not all that is predicated of individuals can
be directly {formaliter) predicated of universals and vice versa. Wyclif thought that
a universal of the category of substance could directly receive only the predications
of substantial forms more common than itself (that is, those forms which are put on
a higher level in the linea praedicamentalis)βι On the other hand, the accidental
forms inhering in substantial individuals could be predicated of the substantial form
itself that those individuals instantiate only indirectly (essentialiter), through and in
virtue of the individuals of that substantial form.82 So Wyclif's description of the
logical structure of the relationship between universals and individuals also de-
manded a redefinition of predication. In fact, it was necessary to introduce a new
kind of predication, unknown to Aristotle, to cover the cases of indirect inherence
of an accidental form in a substantial universal, admitted by the theory.83 Therefore
Wyclif distinguished three main types of predication, that he conceived as a real
relation which holds between metaphysical entities.84
intentionis, secundo communicabilitatem vel praedicationem de multis suppositis, quae est
res secundae intentionis, et tertio intelligibilitatem propriam intellectus cum res universalis
sit appropriate intelligibilis sic quod insensibilis a sensu corporeo." This analysis of the
referents of the term 'universal is similar to that of Scotus (cf. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones
super universalia Porphyrii, q. 3, in Opera omnia, vol. I, ed. L. Wadding [Lugduni, 1639],
pp. 89-90). The only remarkable difference concerns the third sense of the term. In fact,
according to the Doctor Subtilis, 'universal' interpreted formally says the three following
things: (1) common natures; (2) properties of second intention, like being-a-genus, being-
a-species, and so on; and (3) the entities which are made up by the union of a common
nature with one of these properties of second intention.
80. Cf. Albert the Great, Liber de praedicabilibus, tr. 2, chap. 3, 5, and 8, in Opera
omnia, vol. I (Lugduni, 1651) pp. 15-16, 20, and 24.
81. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 11, p. 239.
82. Cf. Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 3, p. 35; and Tractatus
de universalibus, chap. 11, p. 244.
83. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, p. 37: "Aristoteles autem non admisit
praedicationem nisi formalem, vel per se vel per accidens. Ideo conceditur quod Aristoteles
ignoravit dictam praedicationem 'Deus est homo'."
84. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, pp. 35-36. On Wyclif's theory of predi-
cation see Spade, intro., pp. xxxi-xli; Conti, "Logica intensionale," pp. 210-18.
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In the Purgans errores circa unίversalia in communi they are the following:
formal predication {praedicatio formalis), essential predication (praedicatio se-
cundum essentiam), and causal predication (praedicatio secundum causam)β5 In
the Tractatus de universalibus causal predication has been replaced by habitudinal
predication {praedicatio secundum habitudinem)—a kind of predicatio that Wy-
clif had already recognized in the Purgans errores circa universalia, but whose
position within the main division of the types of predication was not clear.86 In the
Tractatus, formal predication, essential predication, and habitudinal predication
are described as three non-mutually exclusive ways of predicating, each more
general than the preceding one (or ones).87
One speaks of causal predication when the form designated by the predicate-
term is not present in the entity signified by the subject-term, but it is something
caused by that entity.88 No instances of this kind of predication are given by Wyclif.
In the works of two of his Oxonian followers, William Penbygull89 and Roger
Whelpdale,90 however, one finds this example: ((Dies est latio solis super ter-
ram "—and nothing prevents us from assuming it as appropriate for Wyclif as well.
Praedicatio formalis, praedicatio secundum essentiam, and praedicatio se-
cundum habitudinem are defined almost in the same way in the Purgans errores
circa universalia and in the Tractatus de universalibus. Formal predication is that
predication in which the form designated by the predicate-term is directly present
in the entity signified by the subject-term. This happens whenever an item in the
categorical line is predicated of something inferior, or an accident of its subject of
inherence. In fact, in both of them, the subject-term and the predicate-term refer
to the same reality in virtue of the form connotated by the predicate-term itself.
Formal predication is predication in which there is predicated something
which formally inheres in a subject. By 'formally inhering in' I mean some-
thing which identically applies to the subject in respect of the notion by which
it is, as 'a divine person is God' 'man is an animal' and 'Peter is musical', and
in general whenever a superior is primarily and per se predicated of its
inferior, or an accident of its subject.91
85. Cf. Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 2, in S. H. Thomson, "A
'Lost' Chapter of Wyclif's Summa de enteΓ Speculum 4 (1929): 342. As a matter of fact,
the ms. Cambridge, Trinity College, B.16.2, used by Dziewicki for his edition of the work,
lacks the second chapter and the first section of the third chapter. S. H. Thomson integrated
the text on the basis of the ms. Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbiblίothek, 4307.
86. Cf. Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 3, p. 34.
87. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, pp. 35-36. "Istae tres maneries praedi-
candi non distinguuntur ex opposito, cum utraque posteriorum sit priori amplior."
88. Cf. Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 2, Thomson, "A 'Lost'
Chapter," p. 343: "Predicacio vero secundum causam est quando predicatum non formaliter
vel ydemtίce est subiectum sed causatur essencialiter ab illo."
89. Cf. Penbygull, De universalibus, 188.
90. Cf. Whelpdale, Tractatus de universalibus, ms. London, Britis Library, Harley
2178, f. lOlvb-transcribed in Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, Appendix iv, p. 190.
91. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, pp. 28-29 (Kenny's trans, p. 4): "Est autem
praedicatio formalis praedicatio qua praedicatur formaliter inexistens subiecto. Et voco
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To speak of predication secundum essentίam it is sufficient that the same
empirical reality is both the real subject and predicate, even though the formal
principle connotated by the predicate-term differs from that connotated by the
subject-term. 'God is man' and 'The universal is particular' are instances of
predication secundum essentiam. In fact, the same empirical reality (or essence)
which is a universal is also an individual, but the forms connotated by the
subject-term and by the predicate-term are different:
Essential predication is predication in which the same essence is the subject
and predicate, even though the notion of the predicate differs from the notion
of the subject, as in 'God is man', 'Fire is water', 'The universal is particu-
lar.'^
Finally, one speaks of predication secundum habitudinem when the form
connotated by the predicate-term does not inhere, directly or indirectly, in the
essence designated by the subject, but simply implies a relation to it, so that the
same predicate may be at different times truly or falsely spoken of its subject,
without there being any change in the subject itself. According to Wyclif, one uses
such a kind of predication mainly when one wants to express theological truths
such as: that God is known and loved by many creatures, and brings about, as
efficient, exemplar, and final cause, many good effects.93
It is evident that habitudinal predication does not require any kind of identity
between the entity signified by the subject-term and the entity signified by the
predicate-term; however, formal predication and essential predication do. So the
ontological presuppositions of the most general type of predication, implied by the
other types, are completely different from those of the other two.
This fact explains why the subsequent generations of Oxford logicians tried
to improve Wyclif's theory of predication by excluding predication secundum
habitudinem and redefining the other two kinds of predication in a slightly
different way. According to Alyngton, Sharpe, Penbygull, Milverley, Whelpdale,
'formaliter inexistere' illud quod identice convenit subiecto secundum rationem qua est, ut
'Persona divina est Deus', 'Homo est animal' et 'Petrus est musicus', et breviter quan-
documque per se primo superius praedicatur de suo inferiori, vel accidens de suo subiecto."
See also, Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 2, in Thomson, "A 'Lost'
Chapter," p. 342.
92. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, p. 30 (Kenny's trans, p. 4): "Praedicatio vero
secundum essentiam est praedicatio in qua eadem essentia est subiectum et praedicatum,
licet alia sit ratio praedίcatί quam sit ratio subiecti, ut hie: 'Deus est homo', 'Ignis est aqua',
'Universale est singulare'. " See also, Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap.
2, in Thomson, "A 'Lost' Chapter," pp. 342-43.
93. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 1, p. 34: "Tertia est praedicatio secundum
habitudinem ex qua secundum genus adveniente subiecto non oportet ipsum ut sic esse
proprie mobile, ut contingit rem intelligi, amari, varie causare et acquirere sibi ubicationem,
quandalitatem et quotlibet relationes rationis, sine hoc quod ipsum ut sic moveatur vel sit
mobile." See also, Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 3, p. 34.
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and Tarteys, predication is divided only into formal and secundum essentiam.
Predication secundum essentiam shows a partial identity between subject and
predicate, which share some, but not all, metaphysical component parts, and does
not require that the form connotated by the predicate-term is directly present in
the essence denotated by the subject-term. Formal predication, on the contrary,
requires such a direct presence. If the form connotated by the predicate-term is
intrinsic to the nature of the subject, then the predication is formalis essentialis,
while if it is extrinsic, the predication is formalis accidentalis. Ήomo est animaV
is an instance of formal essential predication; 'Sortes est albus' is an instance of
formal accidental predication. Unlike Wyclif, who applied predication secundum
essentiam to second intentions, these later philosophers thought that it held also
when applied to first intentions. So they affirmed that it was possible to predicate
of the universal-man (homo in communi) the property of being white, if at least
one of its individuals was white. However they made sure to use as a predicate-
term a substantival adjective in its neuter form, because only in this way can it
appear that the form connotated by the predicate-term is not directly present in the
subject, but it is indirectly attributed to it, through its individuals. Therefore they
acknowledged the proposition 'homo in communi est album' as a true one, if at
least one of the existing men was white. According to them the praedicatio
formalis essentίalis and the praedicatio formalis accidentalis would correspond
to Aristotle's essential and accidental predication. But, as a matter of fact, they
agreed with Wyclif in regarding predication secundum essentiam as more general
than formal predication. As a consequence, in their theories the formal predication
is a particular type of essential predication. This means that they implicitly
recognized a single ontological pattern, founded on a partial identity, as the basis
of every kind of predicational statement. But in this way, the praedicatio formalis
essentialis and the praedicatio formalis accidentalis are very different from their
Aristotelian models, as they express degrees in identity as well as the predication
secundum essentiam.94
The final result of Wyclif's "revolution" is therefore a fully developed system
of intensional logic, which his followers added to (or, better, allowed to overlap
with) the standard extensional system, inherited from Aristotle. As a result: (1) the
copula of the propositions which they deal with cannot be extensionally inter-
preted, as it does not mean that a given object is a member of a certain set, nor
that a given set is included in another, but it means degrees in identity; and (2)
individuals and universals, considered as metaphysical compounds, appear to be
hypostatisations of intensions, since individuals come from the species specialis-
simae by means of rationes suppositales just as species come from superior genera
by means of the differentiae specificae. Only in virtue of renouncing an exten-
sional approach to the matter were Wyclif and his followers able to give a logically
satisfactory solution of the problem of the relationship between universals and
94. On this subject see Conti, "Π trattato De universalibus di William Penbygull," pp.
145-64; Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in Sharpe, Quaestio super universalia, pp. 309-17,
and 323; Conti, "Linguaggio e realta," pp. 199-208.
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individuals, which had always been the most difficult issue for medieval forms of
Realism.
V. THE FORMAL DISTINCTION
A.
The principle which inspires Wyclif's philosophy is that of the analytic correspon-
dence between the logical connections in discourse and the framework of reality.
He was firmly convinced that thought is spontaneously modelled on reality itself,
so that it reproduces reality in all its elements, levels, and inner relations. There-
fore, the best way of understanding the world lay for Wyclif in an accurate
investigation of mental notions and conceptual schemes, as they show the struc-
ture of reality. The tool that he utilised in building up his system was the formal
distinction, a "family" of identity-concepts (more precisely: partial-identity-con-
cepts, since no essence is totally identical with another) that he drew from Duns
Scotus's two-fold notion of formal distinction. In fact, the Doctor Subtilis gave
two different definitions of formal distinction. He describes it in the Lectura95 and
in the Ordinatio96 as a symmetrical relation between two entities which cannot
exist separately:
—two entities x and y are formally distinct iff (a) both of them are constitutive
elements of the same reality, but (b) neither of them can exist by itself, and
(c) neither as part of the definition of the other— 97
but in the Reportata Parisiensia9S he defines it as an a-symmetrical relation
between a whole reality and one of its constitutive elements:
95. Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1 ^ , ed. Vaticana, 16: 216.
96. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4, ed. Vaticana, 2: 356-57; Ordinatio
II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 6, ed. Vaticana, 7: 483-84.
97. Cf. Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4, ed. Vaticana, 16: 216: "Multiplex
est unitas in rebus. Primo est unitas aggregations, post quam est unitas unius per accidens,
ut 'hominis albi', post quam est unitas compositi, post quam est unitas simplicitatis. Et in
unitate simplici secundum rem adhuc potest esse differentia formalis: sicut unitas generis
et differentiae, licet sit secundum rem in re simplici, tamen non sunt formaliter idem, quia
idem formaliter sunt quae sic se habent quod in definitione unius cadit alterum; nunc autem
si genus et differentia definirentur, in definitione unius non caderet aliud. Sic etiam si
definiretur deitas, in eius definitione non caderet paternitas. Igitur post unitatem realem est
unitas formalis, qua aliqua sunt idem formaliter et non solum realiter. Licet igitur aliqua
sint idem realiter, tamen possunt differre secundum suas rationes formales, fundatas et ortas
in re, et non per operationem intellectus."
98. Cf. Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia I, d. 33, qq. 2-3, and d. 34, q. 1, ed.
Wadding (1639), 11: 186-89, and 190.
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—the entity x is not formally identical with another entity y iff(a) y is not part
of the definition of x, but (b) x and y are one and the same thing in reality."
Scotus uses the formal distinction in order to illustrate (1) how the genus and the
specific difference, and the specific nature and the individual difference are linked
together, and (2) the relations which hold between the divine nature and its three
Persons, and between the human soul and its faculties.100
B.
Wyclif explains the notion of distinctio (or differentia) formalis in the Purgans
errores circa universalia in communi (fourth treatise of the first book of the
Summa de ente) and in the later Tractatus de universalibus. The two versions
differ from each other in some important points, and are both unsatisfactory, as
Wyclif's definitions of the different types of distinction are rather ambiguous. He
writes in the Purgans errores circa universalia in communi:
It must be noted that difference, or distinction, can be taken in six senses, and
consequently identity too. (i) Some things differ because of their supposits.
And this in two ways: (i.a) so that they are different singular essences, like
two men; or (i.b) so that they are the same singular essence, like the three
divine Persons, or three things of the same soul (that is, memory, reason, and
will), (ii) Some things differ by nature; and this in two ways: or (ii.a) so that
they are the same singular supposit, like matter and its substantial form, and
human nature and divine nature in Christ; or (ii.b) so that they are totally
separable from each other, like form and alien matter, (iii) Some things differ
in species, . . . like man and donkey, (iv) Some things differ because of the
inhering genus, or highest genus, like spirit and body, substance and quality.
(v) Some things differ more than in genus, like categorical beings and extra-
categorical truths, (vi) And finally some things differ because of a notional
difference only. It happens when they are the same in essence, without any
real distinction, but one differs formally (that is, by means of a form) from
99. Cf. Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia I, d. 33, p. 186: "Dicuntur autem aliqua
non habere identitatem formalem, quando unum non est de per se, et primo intellectu
alterius, ut definitio, vel partes definitionis de intellectu definiti; sed quando neutra includi-
tur in formali ratione alterius, licet tamen sint eadem realiter."
100. On Scotus' formal distinction see: M. J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of
Duns Scotus (Washington D.C., 1994); R. G. Wengert, "The Development of the Doctrine
of the Formal Distinction in the Lectura prima of John Duns Scotus," The Monist 49
(1965); 571-87; A. B. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction" in John Duns Scotus 1265-1965,
ed. J. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (Washington D.C., 1965), pp. 45-60; M. McCord
Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," Fransciscan Studies 36 (1976): 25-43; A.
B. Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. M. McCord Adams
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), pp. 27-48.
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the other, like more common and less common. All these differences can be
reduced to these two: real difference and notional difference.101
According to this text, there are two main kinds of difference, seemingly the
same as those recognized by the moderate realists of the end of the thirteenth
century: the real difference (the cases i-v) and the difference secundum ra-
tionem—or formal difference, as Wyclif will call it later on (the last case). But
things are distinct in the first way when: (1) each one can exist without the other
(cases i, ii.b, iii-v); or (2) being complementary, have got dissimilar natures (the
case ii.a).102 Things are formally distinct from each other when: (1) they are one
and the same essence in reality; but (2) their own formal principles are not the
same—as it happens to a nature and its instantiations (that is, its supposita).
Therefore, Wyclif's differentia secundum rem and differentia secundum rationem
are not the same as the traditional ones. Wyclif's real difference, in addition to the
Aristotelian numerical, specific, generic, and plus-quam generic differences,103
also covers the Scotistic formal distinction as defined in the Lectura and in the
101. Purgans errores circa universalia in communi, chap. 4, p. 38: "Notandum quod
sextupliciter potest accipi differencia vel distinccio aliquorum, sicut et idemptitas. < i >
Aliqua enim distinguntur suppositis, et hoc dupliciter: <i.a> vel sic, quod sint diverse essen-
cίe singulares, ut duo homines; <i.b> vel sic, quod sint eadem essencia singularis, ut persone
divine, et tres res eiusdem anime. <i i> Aliqua autem distinguntur secundum naturam, et hoc
dupliciter: <ii.a> vel sic, quod sint idem suppositum singulare, ut generaliter materia et sua
forma substancialis, et natura humana, ac natura divina in Cristo; <ii.b> vel sic, quod sint
omnino separabiles, ut forma et materia aliena. <iίi> Aliqua vero distinguntur specie,... ut
homo et asinus. <iv> Aliqua autem distinguntur genere intrinseco vel generalissimo, ut
spiritus et corpus, substancia et qualitas. < v > Aliqua autem plus quam genere: ut ens predi-
cabile, et veritas extra genus. <vi> Set postremo distinguntur aliqua solum secundum ra-
cionem, quando sunt idem essencialiter sine distinccione reali, unum tamen non est
formaliter reliqum, ut communius et suum per se inferius. Possunt autem omnes iste differen-
cie reduci ad differenciam secundum rem, et differenciam secundum racionem."
102. On the relationship between matter and form—the only two "things" which differ
from each other in the sense ii.a—see De entepraedicamentali, chap. 5, p. 43: "Tercio patet,
quod una et eadem essencia est materia, forma et unio illarum. Materia enim non est nisi es-
sencia absoluta posse existere vel informari, et forma non est nisi eandem essenciam actu-
aliter existere vel informari, et unio istorum non est nisi eandem essenciam esse unum ex hoc,
quod formaliter est id, quod est ad eius potenciam, et totum hoc est ilia essencia. Ex quo patet,
quod quelibet essencia est perpetua; quia non posset desinere esse, nisi per anίchilacionem,
sed nichil potest anichilari, ut hie supponitur; ergo etc. Secundo patet, quod accidit essencia,
quod sit ignis, aer vel aliud corpus quodcumque, ymo quod sit continuum vel discretum. Nam
materia prima non corrumpitur propter generaciones huiusmodi formarum; sed manet sub
qualibet, contrariis formis sub diversis temporibus; ergo et essencia, que est ilia materia, cum
materia dicit ultra essenciam relacionem ad formam in communi. Tercio patet, quod quelibet
essencia est terna, quia quelibet talis est tres res, quarum quelibet est eiusdem communis es-
sencia, scilicet potencia, actus et unio eorum etc."
103. According to the common view, the plus-quam-generic difference was the dif-
ference which held between the res of the sub-lunar world and the heavenly ones, as the
former were conceived of as corruptible and the latter as uncorruptible. In Wyclif's view,
this difference held between the categorical beings and the non-categorical ones, as the
former have a distinctive nature and the latter do not.
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Ordinatio—considering that the second sense of the differentia secundum suppo-
sita (the case i.b) is a reformulation of the first kind of Scotus's formal distinction,
where the first two requisites have been so modified: two (or more) entities differ
secundum supposita iff they (a) are the same single essence but (b) can be
regarded as independent realities. As far as the difference secundum rationem is
concerned, it is evident that it does not mean real identity and conceptual distinc-
tion, as it was commonly maintained, but it is a sort of transcription of the Scotistic
formal distinction as defined in the Reportata Parisiensia.104 In the Purgans
errores circa universalia in communi, Wyclif was therefore trying to incorporate
the novelties of the Scotistic approach to the problem of identity and distinction
into the traditional Aristotelian framework.
Six years later, in the Tractatus de universalibus Wyclif was to modify his
attitude, adopting the opposite point of view, as he attempted to include the
Aristotelian theory within a Scotistic context.105 According to the De universali-
bus there are three main types of difference (or distinction): real-and-essential;
real-but-not-essential; and formal (formaliter vel secundum rationem).106 Wyclif
does not define the real-and-essential difference, but identifies it through a rough
account of its three sub-types. The things which differ really-and-essentially are
those things which differ from each other or (a) in genus, like man and quantity,
or (b) in species, like man and donkey, or (c) in number, like two human beings.107
The real-but-not-essential difference is more subtle than the first one, since
it holds between things which are the same single essence, and really differ from
each other nevertheless—like memory, reason, and will, which are one and the
same soul, and the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, who are the one and same
God.10**
The third main type of distinction is the formal one. It is described as the
difference by which things differ from each other even though they are constitu-
tive elements of the same single essence or supposit:
104. Cf. for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 28, a. 3; q. 30, a. 2;
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet X, q. 7, ed. R. Macken (Leiden, 1981), p. 165; Walter Burley,
Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias, q. 4, p. 273.
105. Assuming that the Purgans errores circa universalia in communi was written in
1367-1368 (cf. W. R. Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, p. 20) and the Tractatus
in 1373-1374 (cf. Mueller's intro. to his critical ed. pp. xxii-xxx).
106. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 4, pp. 90-92.
107. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 4, pp. 90-91. "Notandum primo quod
'diversitas' vel 'distinctio' multipliciter intelligitur, . . . Aliqua enim differunt secundum
genus, quae est maxima differentia rerum per se in genere, ut homo et quantitias, alia in
specie, ut homo et asinus, et alia in numero, ut Petrus et Paulus. Et quaelibet talis est
differentia essentialis."
108. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 4, p. 91: "Secundo differunt aliqua differ-
entia subtiliori, licet sint eadem essentia singularis. Ut tres res spiritus creati, scilicet
memoria, ratio et voluntas, distinguuntur realiter, licet sint eadem substantia, sicut spiritus
increatus est tres res, quarum quaelibet est idem spiritus. Ista autem differentia est realis,
licet non essentialis vel substantialis."
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The third difference is the formal difference, or notional difference, by which
things may differ even though they are all alike within the same single essence
or supposit.109
According to Wyclif, this is the case for: (1) the concrete accidents inhering in the
same substance, as they coincide in the same particular subject, but differ from
each other because of their own natures; (2) the matter and substantial form of the
same individual substance; (3) what is more common in relation to what is less
common, like (a) the divine nature and the three Persons, (b) the world and this
world, and (c) among the categorical items belonging to the same category, a
superior item and one of its inferiors.110
This account of the various types of difference is more detailed than the
preceding one, but not more clear: what is the difference between the definition
of the real-but-not-essential difference and that one of the differentia formalist
What feature do all the kinds of formal distinction "agree" in? In any case,
some points are obvious: (1) the real-and-essential difference matches the tra-
ditional real difference; (2) the real-but-not-essential difference and the first
sub-type of the formal difference (that is the distinction which holds between
two—or more—concrete accidents of the same singular substance) are two
slightly different versions of the Scotistic formal distinction as defined in the
Lectura and in the Ordinatio; (3) the third sub-type of the formal difference is
a reformulation of the Scotistic formal distinction as described in the Reportata
Parisiensia.
In relation to the analysis proposed in the Purgans errores circa universalia
in communi, the main apparent dissimilarities are the following: (1) There are
three general kinds of differences instead of two, since the second case of the
differentia secundum supposita of the Purgans errores has become the real-but-
not-essential difference of the De universalibus—as the examples employed
show; (2) Notwithstanding the presence of the qualification of 'real', the real-but-
not-essential difference is closer to the formal difference than the second case of
109. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 4, p. 91 (Kenny's trans, p. 29): "Tertia est
differentia formalis vel secundum rationem, qua res differunt, licet conveniant in eadem
singulari essentia vel supposito."
110. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 4, pp. 91-92: "Differentia formalis vel
secundum rationem capit multiplicem divisionem, ut aliqua differunt secundum formam
accidentalem, licet conveniant in subiecto. Ut quantitas, qualitas, relatio et cetera genera
convenientia in eodem subiecto singulari, sunt omnia idem subiecto singulari, licet in suis
naturis differant in genere. . . . Secundo differunt aliqua formaliter vel secundum rationem
quando sunt idem suppositum sed naturae incompletae quantumcumque dispares, ut mate-
ria et forma substantialis. . . . Tertio modo differunt aliqua secundum rationem com-
munions et minus commune. Et sic ponunt quidam distinctionem rationis inter naturam
divinam et personam, cum natura sit communicabilis multis personis, non sic autem
persona. Secundo sic distinguitur mundus simpliciter ab isto mundo, cum species mundi
creditur de Dei potentia posse plurificari etsi non simul vel successive. . . . Tertio sic
distinguitur universale superius et suum inferius; secundum rationem amplioris communi-
cabilitatis. Et sic differt genus a sua specie et generaliter omne superius a suo inferiori".
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the differentia secundum supposΐta. In fact, in the Tractatus de unίversalibus the
term 'essence' has the technical meaning of real entity with a given nature, and so
it is equivalent to 'res'. Consequently, (in the translation) 'real' is the qualifier of
'not essential', and not vice versa; and (3) The first case of differentia secundum
naturam (a sub-type of real difference in the Purgans errores circa universalia in
communi) is seen as a sub-type of formal distinction.
C.
If the foregoing account is correct, Wyclif's last formulation of the difference-the-
ory and his theory of universals and predication are linked together, and rest upon
a sort of componential analysis, where things substitute for lexemes and ontologi-
cal properties for semantic features. In such a world, difference (or partial identity)
is the unique kind of transcendental relation holding among world objects, as in
virtue of its metaphysical composition everything is at the same time partially
identical-to and different-from any other. When the objects at issue are categorical
items and among what differentiates them there is the esse existere individuum,
the objects differ essentialiter. If the objects share the same esse existere indivi-
duum and what differentiates them is (at least) one of their concrete metaphysical
components (or features), then the objects differ realiter, whereas, if what differ-
entiates them is one of their abstract metaphysical components, then they differ
formaliter.
Formal distinction is therefore the tool by means of which the dialectic
one-many internal to the world objects is regulated. It explains why one and the
same thing is at the same time an atomic state of affairs, and how many different
beings can constitute just one thing.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Late medieval Nominalists drew a sharp distinction between things as they exist
in the extra-mental world and the various forms by means of which we think of
and talk about them. While the world consists only of two kinds of individu-
als—substances and qualities—the concepts by which they are grasped and ana-
lysed are universal and of ten different types. Nor do the relations through which
we connect our notions in a proposition closely correspond to the real links which
join individuals in a state of affairs. Thus, our conceptual forms do not coincide
with the elements and structures of reality, and our knowledge does not reproduce
its objects, but merely regards them.
Wyclif maintained that such an approach to philosophical questions was
misleading and deleterious. Many times in his works he expressed the deepest
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hostility to such a tendency.111 He thought that only on the ground of a close
isomorphism between language and world could the signifying power of terms
and statements, the possibility of definitions, and finally the validity and univer-
sality of our knowledge be explained and ensured. So the nucleus of his metaphys-
ics lies in his trust in the scheme object-label as the general interpretative key of
every logico-epistemological problem. Wyclif firmly believed that language was
an ordered collection of signs, each referring to one of the constitutive elements
of reality, and that true (linguistic) propositions were like pictures of their inner
structures or/and mutual relationships. From this point of view, universals are
conceived of as those real essences common to many individual things which are
necessary conditions for our language to be significant. Wyclif thought that, by
associating common terms with such universal realities, the fact could be ac-
counted for that each common term can stand for many things at once and can
label all of them in the same way.
This conviction explains the main characteristic of his philosophical style, to
which all his contributions can be traced back: a strong "propensity" towards
hypostatisation. Wyclif methodically replaces logical and epistemological rules
with ontological criteria and references—as shown by his theory of being. Not
only does he consider ens in communί a reality, he also: (1) equates being with
truth, so stating the metaphysical complexity of every created being;112 (2) con-
ceives of second intentions as real determinations joined to the modes of being of
the extra-mental things;113 and (3) thinks of logic as turning on structural forms,
independent of both their semantical contents and mental acts by which they are
grasped.114 It is through these forms that the network connecting the basic con-
stituents of the world (individuals and universals, substances and accidents, con-
crete properties, like being-white, and abstract forms, like whiteness) is disclosed
to us. His peculiar version of analogy and his theory of distinction are logically
111. Cf. for instance De ente praedicamentali, chap. 6, p. 50; chap. 8, pp. 76-78;
Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, pp. 65 and 68; chap. 15, pp. 359-371, passim.
112. Cf. for instance Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, pp. 55-56: "Redeundo igitur
conceditur res unίversales vere significare seipsas dum sunt obiecta intellectus, et vere
praedicantur et subiciuntur. Intellίgunturque nunc complexe et nunc incomplexe, et, ut sic,
sunt veritates complexa vel incomplexa. Sicut enim intellectus comprehendit Deum et
componit—secundum esse intelligibile—unam rem cum alia, sic et complectitur vel in-
complectitur apprehensum. Et, ut sic, dicitur res extra complexum vel incomplexum et
secundarie signum eius. Actus autem complectendi vel simplicis apprehensionis vocatur
nunc complexio vel incomplexio, et nunc complexus vel incomplexus."
113. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, p. 67: "Dico igitur quod species vel
genus, de quo loquitur Aristoteles, est intentio praedicabilis de multis in quid. Sed non
intelligamus per 'intentionem' conceptum animae humanae vel similitudinem ab ea fictam,
sed effectum creabilem quern principaliter intendit natura." See also, p. 68.
114. Cf. Tractatus de universalibus, chap. 2, p. 56: "Et sic Aristoteles mirabili subtili-
tate complectitur in logica tarn notitiam signorum quam notitiam signatorum. Cum enim
logica sit medium inter grammaticam et metaphysicam, oportet ipsam participare condί-
tionibus utriusque, tractando principaliter de rebus, cum sit medium ad metaphysicam, et
secundarie de signis, cum sit finis grammaticae."
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necessary requirements of this philosophical approach. It would be impossible to
find out any kind of unity in the multiplicity of beings without them. They are two
absolute novelties in late medieval philosophy, and certainly the most important
contributions of Wyclif to the thought of his times together with his analysis of
predication.
Still, Wyclif's system, so rigorous in its general design, contains—as we have
seen—unclear and aporetic points that Alyngton, Sharpe, Penbygull, and other
Oxonian logicians later attempted to remove. Although an influential thinker,
Wyclif pointed to the strategy Realists of the end of the Middle Ages were to adopt
rather than fully developing it.

